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Abstract
We study cooperation in economies of indefinite duration. Participants faced a
sequence of prisoner’s dilemmas with anonymous opponents. We identify and
characterize the strategies employed at the individual level. We report that (i) grim
trigger does not describe well individual play and there is wide heterogeneity in
strategies; (ii) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation; (iii)
coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience. We discuss
alternative methodologies and implications for theory.
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1. Introduction
Fostering cooperation in society can be problematic when agents who face a social dilemma do
not know each other and cannot easily establish reputations. The individual appeal of
opportunistic behavior is especially strong when it is difficult to communicate intentions, to
maintain stable partnerships, or to monitor and to enforce cooperation of others. Yet, Folk
Theorem-type results suggest that, over the long haul, none of these frictions present a
fundamental obstacle to cooperation.1 Groups of self-regarding agents can overcome the shortrun temptation to cheat others by employing a social norm threatening permanent defection
through a decentralized punishment scheme that spreads by contagion. Studying these dynamics
is central because, as Binmore (2005, p.818) points out, “the ideas that motivate the folk theorem
of repeated game theory remain our best hope of understanding how societies hold together and
adapt to new challenges”. The open question is how, in practice, groups of agents reach
cooperation when theoretically feasible and what strategies they adopt to sustain it.2
We address this question through an experiment where subjects faced an indefinitely
repeated prisoner's dilemma implemented through a random stopping rule (e.g., as in Palfrey and
Rosenthal, 1994, Dal Bó, 2005). Each subject was assigned to a group of four. In each period,
each group was randomly divided into two pairs that played the prisoner’s dilemma. Subjects
could not identify opponents and could only observe outcomes in their own pair. Each subject
played a sequence of five supergames. In each supergame every subject was assigned to a
different group formed according to a perfect stranger protocol.
1

The foundation for this statement traces back to the Folk Theorem in Friedman (1971) and the random-matching
extensions in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994).
2
The relevance of such a question has been recently emphasized by Ostrom (2010, p. 660), who writes that “Simply
assuming that humans adopt norms […] is not sufficient to predict behavior in a social dilemma, especially in very
large groups with no arrangements for communication.”
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Our design makes it possible to empirically identify and characterize strategies employed by
subjects. The empirical evidence about strategies adopted in indefinitely repeated games is still
limited, and it is confined to two-person economies of short-duration with a subject pool of
undergraduates (Engle-Warnick et al., 2004, Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2006, Aoyagi and
Fréchette, 2009, Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011, Fudenberg et al., forthcoming). This study
advances the understanding of how subjects play indefinitely repeated games by studying their
behavior in four-person economies of substantially longer duration than in the literature, and
with a varied subject pool (undergraduates, MBA students, white-collar workers).
We study economies where anonymous subjects are not in stable partnerships, which are the
theoretical platform of an important segment of the economic literature. Consider for instance the
matching models in macroeconomics as in Diamond (1982) or in Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994), and the decentralized trading models in microeconomics as in Kandori (1992) and
Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990). A key feature of these models and of our experiment is
that it is impossible for a subject to build a reputation. Clearly, no model can perfectly fit
situations in the field and a similar argument generally applies to experiments. In our laboratory
economies we control the informational flows and the matching process to capture essential
“trade frictions” characteristic of larger economies. In particular: subjects may not know and
may not trust each other, reputation is hard to establish, it is difficult or costly to monitor the
actions of all other members of society, to communicate intentions, and institutions for
enforcement have limitations.
Folk theorem-type results show that a long-run interaction can sustain a multiplicity of
equilibrium outcomes but do not offer much guidance regarding which equilibrium will be
selected. We report that full efficiency is rarely achieved in our experimental economies, which
3

suggests that efficiency may not be the key equilibrium selection criterion (see also Duffy and
Ochs, 2009, and Duffy et al., forthcoming). Such result contrasts with the assumption in many
applications of theories of infinitely repeated games. Moreover, in these theories the efficiency
frontier is often traced through a “grim trigger” strategy whereby all players cooperate under the
threat of a contagious process of economy-wide defection.3 We carry out an individual-level
analysis that sheds light on empirically-relevant equilibrium selection criteria. We find that only
one out of four individuals behaves in a manner consistent with the use of the grim trigger
strategy. These findings challenge the descriptive power of theories based on the notion that
everyone cooperates because of the threat of unforgiving, generalized punishment. The data
suggest that subjects dealt with the heterogeneity in behavior by tolerating some defections in
attempting to coordinate with a subset of participants in the economy. We observe that
systematic defectors and systematic cooperators coexisted within most economies. Subjects tried
out a variety of strategies but these attempts at coordinating failed to sustain high cooperation
rates.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses related works; Section 3 presents the
experimental design; Section 4 provides a theoretical analysis; Section 5 proposes an empirical
procedure for classification of individual strategies and the main results are reported in Section 6;
Section 7 presents results for a maximum likelihood analysis of strategies; Section 8 expands the
analyses by considering an extended strategy set, and Section 9 concludes.
2. Related experimental literature
There are a few experimental studies of the strategies played by subjects in indefinitely repeated
3

This implies that to punish a single defection, innocent cooperators must also be penalized. In this sense, our work
bears similarities to experiments with public good games and common pool resources (e.g., Ostrom et al., 1992,
Fischbacher et al., 2001), where cooperation is not individually rational in the stage game but can be sustained in the
indefinitely repeated game if the grim strategy is adopted.
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games. With one exception, discussed below, all studies we are aware of refer to two-person
economies. The key differences in our set-up are the following: first, economies include four
persons; second, subjects do not interact as partners; third, we consider long-duration economies.
We now present an overview of the papers most related to our study.
Engle-Warnick, McCausland, and Miller (2004) retrieve subjects’ strategies from
experimental data on an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. They model behavior using
finite automata, as we do, while implementing a different experimental design and empirical
technique. Their subjects interacted in a supergame as partners for 5 periods in expectation,
while our subjects interacted as strangers for 20 periods in expectation. Unlike our study, they
employ Bayesian methods and numerical techniques to estimate the distribution of strategies
represented by automata with errors on actions.
Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2006) study an infinitely repeated trust game with 5 periods of
average duration. They empirically identify the strategies employed by subjects by formalizing
strategies using the notion of finite automata (Rubinstein, 1986), as we do. They consider a large
number of automata, which exclude the possibility of errors in the implementation of strategies.
They find that the vast majority of data can be explained using only a small number of strategies.
In particular they find support for grim trigger play between partners.
Aoyagi and Fréchette (2009) study an indefinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma with
imperfectly observable actions, and 10 periods of average duration. They consider a family of
threshold strategies where transitions between cooperative and punishment state depend on four
free parameters. They find support for the use of forgiving strategies, rather than grim trigger.
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) study an indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma with an
expected duration of two or four periods. They estimate subjects’ strategies fitting the data via a
5

maximum likelihood approach, to a set of six possible strategies. They look at the behaviour of
experienced subjects. They find support for “tit for tat” and “always defect”, but unlike EngleWarnick and Slonim (2006), they do not find evidence for grim trigger strategies in their
economies of two players and of very short duration.
Fudenberg et al. (forthcoming) consider a design adapted from Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011)
where actions are observed with noise and there are longer sequences of play. They fit the data
using a set of twenty automata with up to four states following a maximum likelihood approach.
The most common strategies are “tit for two tats” and strategies that trigger permanent
punishment after the second or the third consecutive defection.
Stahl (2009) studies the impact of reputation mechanisms in finitely repeated prisoner’s
dilemmas with random matching. In the absence of a reputation mechanism, subjects did not
sustain cooperation in economies of 22-24 members. With a color-coded reputation mechanism
in place, cooperation was sustained through the use of strategies based on individual reputation,
which is in line with the evidence in Camera and Casari (2009) for indefinitely repeated games in
smaller economies. In contrast, the present study identifies strategies in economies where
reputation mechanisms are ruled out by design and it focuses on individual behavior, which is
not studied in Camera and Casari (2009).
3. Experimental design
The experiment is based on the same design of the Private Monitoring treatment in Camera and
Casari (2009), which is suitable to study strategy selection in an indefinitely repeated prisoner
dilemma where reputation formation is impossible. An economy comprises four persons who
interact privately and anonymously. The interaction is private because subjects observe only
outcomes in their pair but not in the rest of the economy (private monitoring). Subjects are not in
6

a stable partnership but are randomly matched in pairs after every encounter. The interaction is
anonymous because subjects cannot observe identities.
The underlying game is the prisoners’ dilemma described in Table 1. In the experiment,
subjects could choose between Y, for cooperation, and Z for defection. Because of the empirical
difficulty in supporting high levels of cooperation in economies of strangers, the parameters of
the experiment are calibrated to promote some cooperative choices. This is necessary to study
and draw conclusions about the type of strategies people adopt to support cooperative outcomes.4
[Table 1 approximately here]
A supergame (or cycle, as it was called in the experiment) consists of an indefinite interaction
among subjects achieved by a random continuation rule; see Roth and Murninghan (1978). The
interaction is of finite but uncertain duration, because in each period a cycle continues with a
constant probability  For a risk-neutral subject  represents the discount factor. In each
period the cycle is expected to continue for 19 additional periods. To implement this random
stopping rule, at the end of each period the program drew a random integer between 1 and 100,
using a uniform distribution. The cycle continued with a draw of 95 or below. All session
participants observed the same random draw, which means that cycles for all economies
terminated simultaneously.
Each experimental session involved twenty subjects and five cycles. We built twenty-five
economies in each session by creating five groups of four subjects in each of the five cycles.
Matching across cycles followed a perfect stranger protocol: in each cycle each economy
included only subjects who had neither been part of the same economy in previous cycles nor

4

We selected this parameterization as it scores high on the indexes proposed by Rapoport and Chammah (1965) and
Roth and Murnighan (1978) that correlate with the level of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated prisoners’
dilemma in a partner protocol.
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were part of the same economy in future cycles. Subjects did not know how groups were created
but were informed that no two participants ever interacted together for more than one cycle. This
matching protocol across supergames reduces the possibility of contagion effects, as opposed to
a stranger protocol. In short, it is as if each subject had five distinct “lives” in a session.
Participants in an economy interacted in pairs according to the following matching protocol
within a supergame. At the beginning of each period of a cycle, the economy was randomly
divided into two pairs. There are three ways to pair the four subjects and each one was equally
likely. So, a subject had one third probability of meeting any other subject in each period of a
cycle. For the whole duration of a cycle a subject interacted exclusively with the members of her
economy. In each economy, subjects interacted locally in the sense that they could only observe
outcomes in their pair. In addition, they could neither observe identities of opponents, nor
communicate with each other, nor observe histories of others. As a consequence, subjects did not
share a common history. With this private monitoring design, the efficient outcome can be
supported as an equilibrium.
Studying strategy adoption within this experimental design offers several advantages in
comparison to designs based on two-person economies. First, anonymity implies that strategies
based on reputation cannot be employed. In empirical studies, these strategies show a strong
drawing power, although they are not theoretically essential to sustain cooperation.5 Hence, with
anonymity subjects are forced to consider other strategies. Second, in economies with more than
two participants coordination on strategies and outcomes is more interesting and challenging. For

5

Our design adopts private monitoring and random matching among subjects as in the Private Monitoring treatment
of Camera and Casari (2009), where subjects’ behavior substantially differed from behavior in a non-anonymous
public monitoring treatment. With non-anonymous public monitoring subjects mostly defected with opponents who
previously defected with her. Stahl (2009) reports that cooperation could be sustained in a finitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemma game only when a color-coded reputation mechanism was introduced.
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instance it is possible to study if and how a subset of subjects can separately coordinate on a
strategy. Third, subjects are exposed to a variety of behaviors, which facilitates the empirical
identification of strategies.
The experiment involved three distinct groups of subjects: 40 undergraduate students from
various disciplines at Purdue University, 20 full-time MBA students in the Krannert School of
Management, and 40 clerical workers employed as staff throughout Purdue University. Both
MBAs and undergraduates have a strong international component. The clerical workers are
mostly long-time state residents, who exhibit a wide variation in age and educational
backgrounds. Having multiple subject pools is methodologically appealing because it enhances
the external validity of our results.6
All 100 subjects were recruited through e-mail and in-class-announcements. The sessions
were run in the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Lab. No eye contact was possible among
subjects. Instructions were read aloud with copies on all desks. A copy of the instructions is in
the Appendix. Average earnings were $18 excluding show-up fees. A session lasted on average
79 periods for a running time of about 2 hours, including instruction reading and a quiz. Each
session had 20 participants and 5 cycles. 7
4. Theoretical predictions
The theoretical predictions are based on the works in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994), under
the assumption of identical players, who are self-regarding and risk-neutral. Here we concisely

6

Differences across subject pools are studied in the companion paper Bigoni, Camera and Casari (2012).
Sessions took place on the following dates: 21.4.05 (71), 7.9.05 (104), 29.11.05 (80), 06.12.05 (50), 07.02.07 (91).
The total number of periods for the session is in parenthesis. Show-up fees are as follows: undergraduates received
$5; clerical workers received $10; MBAs received $20. Data of the first two sessions are also analyzed in Camera
and Casari (2009). The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).

7
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present the relevant theoretical predictions; for additional details see Camera and Casari (2009).
The stage game is the prisoner dilemma in Table 1. Players simultaneously and independently
select an action from the set {Y,Z}. Total surplus in the economy is maximized when everyone
cooperates, i.e., when all players choose Y. Thus, we refer to the outcome where every player in
the economy selects Y as the efficient or fully cooperative outcome. If both pairs in the economy
select {Z,Z}, then we say that the outcome is inefficient. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium
where both agents defect and earn 10 points.
Under private monitoring, indefinite repetition of the stage game with randomly selected
opponents can expand the set of equilibrium outcomes. Following the work in Kandori (1992)
and Ellison (1994), we present sufficient conditions so that the equilibrium set includes the
efficient outcome, which is achieved when everyone cooperates in every match and all periods.
The inefficient outcome can be supported as a sequential equilibrium using the strategy
“always defect.” Since repeated play does not decrease the set of equilibrium payoffs, Z is
always a best response to play of Z by any randomly chosen opponent. In this case the payoff in
the indefinitely repeated game is the present discounted value of the minmax payoff, z/(). If δ
is sufficiently high, then the efficient outcome can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium, by
threatening to trigger a contagious process of defection, leading to minmax forever. In an
economy with full cooperation, every player receives payoff y/(1). Hence, the main theoretical
consideration is the following:
Let *(0,1) be the unique value of  that satisfies
δ 2 (h  z) + δ (2h  y  z)  3(h  y) = 0 .

If   *, then the efficient outcome is a sequential equilibrium. In the experiment, the efficient
outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium, because =0.95 and *=0.443.
10

We now provide intuition for the above statement. Conjecture that players behave according to
actions prescribed by a social norm. A social norm is a rule of behavior that identifies desirable
play and a sanction to be selected if a departure from the desirable action is observed. We
identify the desirable action by Y and the sanction by Z. Thus, every player must cooperate as
long as she has never played Z or has seen anyone select Z. However, if the player observes Z,
then she must select Z forever after. This is known as a grim trigger strategy.
Given this social norm, in equilibrium everyone cooperates so the payoff to everyone is the
present discounted value of y forever: y/(1). A complication arises when a player might
consider defecting, however, as defection always grants a higher payoff in the stage game. To
deter players from behaving opportunistically, the social norm employs the threat of contagious
process of defection leading to minmax forever. Notice that a player deviates in several
instances—first, in equilibrium, if she has not observed play of Z in the past but chooses Z
currently, and second, off-equilibrium, if she has observed play of Z in the past but plays Y
currently. Cooperating when no defection has been observed is optimal only if the agent is
sufficiently patient. The future reward from cooperating today must be greater than the extra
utility generated by defecting today (unimprovability criterion). Instead, if a defection occurs and
everyone follows the social norm, then everyone ends up defecting since the initial defection will
spread by contagion. Given that our experimental economies have only four players, contagion
can occur very quickly.
For a strategy to be an equilibrium strategy, cooperating after observing a defection should
also be suboptimal. Choosing Y can delay the contagion but cannot stop it. To see why, suppose
a player observes Z. If she meets a cooperator in the next period, then choosing Y produces a
current loss to the player because she earns y (instead of h). If she meets a deviator, choosing Y
11

also causes a current loss because she earns l rather than z. Hence, the player must be sufficiently
impatient to prefer play of Z to Y. The smaller are l and y, the greater is the incentive to play Z.
Our parameterization ensures this incentive exists for all  so it is optimal to play Z after
observing (or selecting) Z.8
Two remarks are in order. First, due to private monitoring, T-periods punishment strategies
cannot support the efficient outcome as an equilibrium. Suppose a pair of agents starts to punish
for T periods, following a defection in the pair. Due to random encounters, this initial defection
will spread at random throughout the economy. Hence, over time different agents in the economy
will be at different stages of their T-periods punishment strategy. Hence, agents cannot
simultaneously revert to cooperation after T periods have elapsed from the initial defection.9
Second, cooperation is risk-dominant in our design, in the following sense. Consider two
strategies, “always defect” against “grim trigger.” Grim trigger is risk-dominant if a player is at
least indifferent to selecting it, given that everyone else is believed to select each strategy with
equal probability. Indifference requires = 0.763.10
5. Estimation procedure for individual strategies
To empirically identify in the experimental data the strategies employed by each subject, we
formalize strategies using the concept of finite automata. As a robustness check, we consider
both deterministic automata as well as automata with a random element.
An automaton is a convenient way to represent the process by which a player implements a

8

With our parameterization, the upper bound to  is 1.125 and the lower bound is 0.443.
In every period of the session, all participants observed the same random integer 1,…,100, which could have
served as a public randomization device. Hence, the efficient outcome could be sustained also by strategies based on
contagious punishment that exploit the availability of a public randomization device; see Ellison (1994).
10
Details on derivations are available upon request. See Blonski and Spagnolo (2001) for an application to infinitely
repeated games among partners. Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo (2011) and Dal Bó and Fréchette (2010) present
experimental evidence on how risk-dominance impact partners’ play in indefinitely repeated games.
9
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rule of behavior in a repeated game (Rubinstein, 1986). The automaton is described by (i) a set
of actions, (ii) a set of states for the player, (iii) an outcome function that specifies the action to
be taken given the player’s state, and (iv) a transition function that specifies the next state that
the player will reach, given his current state and the actions taken by the opponent.
Automata with sufficiently many states can describe any type of behavior observed in the
experiment. We consider only two-state automata. There are various reasons for doing so. This
class of automata is small—there are only 25=32 two-state automata—and yet it allows to
represent most common strategies in the literature, such as “tit-for-tat,” “grim trigger,” “always
defect,” and “always cooperate.”11 Clearly, not all of these automata describe equilibrium
strategies. Moreover, two-state automata describe strategies that are relatively simple, hence
likely to be devised and used by experimental subjects. As an example Figure 1a illustrates “tit
for tat” and “grim trigger.” Actions are either C=Cooperate or D=Defect; a circle corresponds to
a state for the player, where the initial state is a bold circle; the outcome function is the identity
function, i.e. the unique action prescribed is written inside each circle; the solid arrows represent
transitions between states, which depend on the opponent’s action reported next to each arrow.
As seen above, an automaton defines a deterministic action plan, which provides a rigid rule to
capture subject’s behavior. When fitting the data, we relax the rigidity of the rules of behavior by
introducing a random element in the automata. This can accommodate subjects who make some
mistakes in implementing a plan or who pursue some intentional experimentation within their
strategy. The estimation procedure allows for random transitions, i.e., the possibility to reach the
11

There are 2 initial states identified by the action prescribed in that state, C and D, and 2 subsequent states, C or D,
that are reached depending on the 4 possible outcomes of the match (each player has two actions). See Table 2. We
use automata to represent subjects’ play because it is an empirically helpful technique to classify subjects’ behavior.
Clearly, such a representation does not restrict in any way subjects’ freedom of choice during the experiment.
Automata are simply a convenient tool to characterize subjects’ observed patterns of choice. Expanding the set of
automata considered, for instance by including three- or four-state automata, would simply increase the number of
classified individuals and would not alter the equilibrium set.
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incorrect state with some probability p≥0.12 We estimate strategy fitting from a range of values
for p from 0 through 0.40. This allows us to assess how the explanatory power of a given
automaton varies as we increase the probability of errors. With two states, departures from a plan
take one of two forms: the subject may either fail to switch state (say, keeps playing C instead of
switching to D) or may incorrectly switch state (say, plays D instead of keep playing C). The
dashed lines in Figure 1b represent such incorrect or accidental transitions for the case of grim
trigger and tit-for-tat. Randomness on transitions is different from randomness on outcome
functions, as in Engle-Warnick et al. (2004).
[Figure 1 approximately here]
We group the 32 strategies considered into six strategy sets (Table 2). The initial action is C for
four strategy sets and is D for two sets. An additional distinction is whether play is unconditional
or conditional on the observed outcome. Unconditional strategies prescribe only one action
unless mistakes are made. Such strategies comprise the classes of automata called systematically
cooperate and systematically defect, which include as a special case “always cooperate” and
“always defect” (see the note to Table 2 for more details). Conditional strategies starting with C
are divided into three groups: grim trigger, a set of forgiving strategies, and a set of
unconventional strategies. Forgiving strategies prescribe a switch to playing D only if an
opponent chooses D, but allow a switch back to C (e.g., “tit for tat”). Unconventional strategies,
instead, may prescribe D even if no defection has been observed.
[Table 2 approximately here]
The strategy-fitting procedure is a mapping from the experimental data into the strategy sets
12

Note that we are interested in social norms and especially the grim trigger strategy, because it sustains cooperative
equilibria. If everyone plays grim trigger, one mistake moves the economy to permanent punishment. Errors in
transitions allow us to study cases where players may reconsider the wisdom of carrying out extreme punishments or
wish to give a second chance to cooperation.
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of Table 2. The unit of observation is the sequence of all choices of a subject in a cycle, i.e., the
behaviour of an individual or, simply, an individual. We may also refer to such a sequence as one
observation. Hence, one subject contributes five observations in the dataset. For every
individual, we first select the strategy that best describes (“fits”) her sequence of actions among
the thirty-two strategies available. Then, we check whether the description of behavior provided
by this best-fitting strategy is sufficiently accurate. If it is so, then we classify the individual by
that strategy; otherwise, we say that the individual is unclassified by that strategy. Note that one
individual could be classified by more than one strategy. Those who cannot be classified by any
strategy are denoted unclassified individuals.
We say that strategy q “fits” an observation (i.e., an individual) if it can generate an action
sequence consistent with the behavior of the subject in the cycle. The definition of consistency
allows for some experimentation or occasional mistakes. More precisely, let xq,t=1 if a subject’s
action in period t of a cycle corresponds to the outcome generated by a correct implementation of
strategy q, and let X q (T )   1 xq , / T denote the consistency score of that strategy, in a cycle
T

of duration T. The score ranges from zero (no action taken is consistent with strategy q) to one
(correct implementation of q).13 To account for the possibility that subjects may occasionally
depart from the chosen plan of action, we presume a probability p of an incorrect transition exists
that is (i) identical across subjects, (ii) constant across periods and cycles, and (iii) independent
of the strategy considered. Under these conditions, the number n of a subject’s actions that are
inconsistent with a strategy q in a cycle of duration T is distributed according to a binomial with
13

For example let q be “grim trigger” and suppose a subject observes D only in period 1 of a four-period cycle. The
sequence CDDD generates the score Xq=4/4=1. With random transitions, however, the sequence CDCC would
generate Xq=3/4 because only the action in period 3 is inconsistent with grim trigger. An incorrect transition occurs
in period 2 (from state D to C, whereas D should be an absorbing state), but the action in period 4 is consistent with
being (incorrectly) in state C.
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parameters p and T-1. The expected number of inconsistent actions increases with T and
decreases with p so that if p and T are sufficiently small the expected number of inconsistent
action is lower than one. Hence, the average length of a cycle is a crucial design parameter.
Fixing p, we say that strategy q fits an observation or, equivalently, that one individual is
classified according to strategy q, if the following three conditions are satisfied. First, q correctly
predicts the initial action, xq ,1  1 . This is because errors in transition can occur only across
periods; hence, an error can be made only after period 1. Second, q must have the largest
consistency score among all strategies considered, X q (T )  X q ' (T ) for all q’≠q. Finally, if n
actions are inconsistent with q, then the probability of such a realization must be within chance,
given p and T. As a statistical test, strategy q does not fit the observation if the observation lays
in the 10% right tail of the distribution of errors, i.e., the strategy does not fit the observation if
the probability of observing n or more inconsistent actions is smaller than 10%. To fix ideas,
suppose p=0.05. According to our criterion, not even one inconsistent action is admissible in
cycles lasting less than four periods. In a cycle lasting 20 periods, instead, we expect one
incorrect transition and admit at most two incorrect transitions; this means that, for example, a
“grim trigger” player who has started punishing has the chance to move back to a cooperative
state and to retrace his steps back to full defection, and yet to be classified as “grim trigger,”
according to this third condition. If one or more of the above conditions is not met, then the
observation is “unclassified.”
Definition: The total fit N(q) of a strategy q is the number of observations that q fits. The total fit
N(Q) of a strategy set Q is the number of observations that can be explained by at least one
strategy qQ.
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Both the total fit of a single strategy and the total fit of a strategy set are useful measures
because individuals could sometimes be classified by more than one strategy. For this reason, the
total fit of a strategy q provides an upper bound for the number of individuals that employ
strategy q.14 . This problem of classification overlap is more relevant for subjects who did not
experience a sufficient variety of actions in a cycle or played a short cycle. For instance, in a
two-period cycle “grim trigger” and “tit-for-tat” identically fit the observation C in period 1 and
D in period 2 when the initial opponent plays D, and also fit the observation CC when the initial
opponent plays C. When a subject observes the same action (e.g., C) in every meeting, we cannot
infer what the subject would have done if D was observed. As a consequence, if one sums up the
total fit of single strategies in a set Q, qQ N(q), then the figure may be greater than the total fit
N(Q) of the set Q, and can even exceed the total number of observations.
To obtain a tighter classification of individuals, the strategy-fitting procedure is refined as
follows. First, strategy sets are constructed in order to include closely-related strategies. It is thus
possible that a single individual is classified by two strategies if they are in the same set, but less
likely if they belong to different sets. Second, the strategy fitting procedure has been run
separately for individuals who observed heterogeneous actions, i.e. for the subsample of the data
where opponents played both C and D. Tracing the response to out of equilibrium behavior
improves the chances for unique identification. Third, the estimation on this subsample is also
carried out for deterministic strategies. This further reduces classification overlap; for instance,
an individual cannot be identified both by “grim trigger” and by strategies in the set
“systematically cooperate”.15
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This measure is context-independent, i.e., it is invariant to the number and type of strategies considered.
More specifically, we find the following among all classified individuals: first, the average individual is classified
by 4.51 strategies (1827/405, Table 2) and by 1.70 strategy sets (688/405, Table 3). Second, focusing on strategy
15
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6. Results
There are seven main results. Result 1 concerns an analysis of strategy play at the aggregate
level. Results 2-7 are about individuals, i.e., strategies employed by single subjects in each cycle.
Result 1. Consider subjects’ behavior at the aggregate level. In period 1 subjects exhibited a
high cooperation rate. If in the cycle subjects observed a defection, then they persistently
lowered her cooperation rate.
This finding is broadly consistent with the theories in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994)
regarding the existence of a rich equilibrium set, including full cooperation, under private
monitoring.
Choices in the first period of each economy help us determine whether some equilibrium
(among the many possible) had a particularly strong drawing power. Average cooperation level
in period 1 was 67.2%, and in all periods it was 53.8%. Hence, we can rule out that subjects
attempted to coordinate on defection (see Table 4 for cooperation rates disaggregated by cycle
and for period 1 in each cycle). What behavior can explain such patterns of cooperation? Due to
private monitoring, cooperation cannot be supported through T-period trigger strategies. In
contrast, grim trigger can theoretically sustain an equilibrium with 100% cooperation. To
investigate whether the data are consistent with such strategies, we ran a probit regression that
explains subjects’ choice to cooperate (1) or not (0) using two groups of regressors. In this
regression, the unit of observation is a subject’s choice in a period. We introduce dummy
variables that control for fixed effect (cycles, periods within the cycle, subject), as well as for the

sets, the average individual is classified by 1.43 strategy sets when her opponents play both C and D (454/317, Table
3). Third, this figure further reduces to 1.28 with deterministic automata (234/182, Table 3, p=0).
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duration of the previous cycle. To trace the response of subjects in the periods following an
observed defection we include a “grim trigger” regressor that has value 1 in all periods following
an observed defection (0 otherwise). We also include five “lag” regressors that have value 1 only
in one period following an observed defection (0 otherwise). More specifically, the “lag n”
regressor takes value 1 after one, two, three, four or five periods after the observed defection
(n=1,2,3,4,5, respectively) and 0 in all other periods. If subjects switched from a cooperative to a
punishment mode after seeing a defection, then the estimated coefficient of at least one of the six
strategy regressors should be negative. For example, if subjects punished for just two periods
after a defection, then the sum of the estimated coefficients of grim trigger and “lag n” regressors
should be negative for the first two periods after a defection (0 afterwards).
The key result from this analysis is: the defection of an opponent triggered a persistent
decrease in cooperation with very little reversion to a cooperative mode. Figure 2 provides
supporting evidence; it illustrates the marginal effect of experiencing a defection on the
frequency of cooperation in the following periods.16 The marginal effect curves are L-shaped,
i.e., after an initial drop, the curves look generally flat, and no recovery to pre-defection
cooperation levels after five periods can be detected.17 Instead, if subjects adopted a strategy that
allows for reversion to full cooperation, then curves should be U-shaped.18
[Figure 2 approximately here]
Cooperation was the focal point of period 1 play for subjects. When first confronted with a
defection in the match, a substantial fraction of initial cooperators responded with an immediate,
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The representation for “any more than five” period lags is based on the marginal effect of the grim trigger
regressor only. The representation for period lags 1 though 5 is based on the sum of the marginal effects of the grim
trigger regressor and the “lag n” regressors with the appropriate lag.
17
The marginal effects of “lag 1” and “lag 5” regressors are not significantly different (p-value: 0.1144).
18
Additional details on supporting evidence, including regression results, are in the supplementary appendix.
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downward and persistent shift in the frequency of cooperation. Similar analyses are carried out
by Camera and Casari (2009) both for anonymous and non-anonymous economies. Depending
on the anonymity level, such Probit regression analysis revealed substantial differences in the
empirical choice of strategies. The present study enhances the validity of the earlier results on
anonymous economies, by using a larger and more diverse subject pool.
The above analysis is compatible with a fraction of subjects acting as if playing “Grim
trigger” and others playing “Always defect” or “Always cooperate.” However, this is not the
only pattern of strategies that could possibly generate this result. Therefore, to expand on this
initial assessment we carried out a statistical analysis of strategies adopted at the individual level,
proceeding as follows. First, we empirically identify strategies and determine the number of
observations that can be explained by those strategies. Second, we empirically characterize the
strategies most commonly used. Third, we analyze the dynamics of behavior by subject to
understand whether subjects learn to coordinate on certain outcomes and cooperative strategies.
As discussed in the previous Section, the unit of observation is the sequence of all choices of
a subject in a cycle, i.e., the individual. Since there are 100 subjects and five cycles, there are 500
individuals. As an initial step, we wish to determine (i) whether the 32 simple strategies
considered classify a high or small number of individuals and (ii) which strategies are most
successful in doing so. A central result is that, given the identification technique proposed in
Section 5, a high number of individuals can be classified.
Result 2. Consider the behavior of single individuals. When allowing for limited randomness
in behavior (p=5%), thirty-two simple strategies classify 81% of individuals.
The empirical findings are reported starting with Figure 3, illustrating the percentage of
classified individuals as we vary the probability p of incorrect transition (i.e., the
20

experimentation rate) from 0 to 0.40. Varying the probability p serves as a robustness check.
Figure 3 shows the marginal gain in total fit as one changes the probability of incorrect
transition. Fully deterministic automata (p=0) classify more than half of the individuals. The total
fit is 53.0% of individuals. If we increase the probability of incorrect transitions to p=0.05, then
the total fit of the entire strategy set improves substantially, reaching 81.0%. The fit then slowly
tapers out. With p=0.30 we classify almost 100% of individuals. Therefore, in the analysis that
follows, we will report results for p=0.05, unless otherwise stated, and will include detailed
results in Tables 3-4.
[Figure 3 approximately here]
No single group of strategies classifies a majority of individuals. “Systematically cooperate,”
which is the most relevant group, classifies 26.8% of individuals when p=0 and 42.4% when
p=0.05 (Table 3). Considering p=0.05 (Table 2), the best-fitting single strategy is one of those in
the “systematically cooperate” class and it classifies 37.6% of individuals. When taking just two
strategies into account (11100 and 00000), the total fit is 59.8%.19 When taking into account
differences in cycle duration, these figures are in line with the results reported in other studies. In
an indefinitely repeated trust game, Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2006) achieve a total fit of
89.6% when they employ 32 strategies. When taking just two strategies into account they fit
66.8%. However, the average length of a cycle in Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2006) was 5.1
periods, considerably shorter than in our experiment, which matters for comparison purposes
because statistically a strategy has more difficulty in fitting behavior emerging from longer
cycles. Longer cycles allow a better identification of strategies, so as cycle duration increases a
larger strategy set is needed to fit a given number of observations. To see why, consider that a set
19

00000 corresponds to unconditional defection; 11100 describes the behavior of someone who always cooperates
but may switch to permanent defection by mistake.
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of just two strategies such as “grim trigger” and “always defect” fits 100% of observations of
one-period cycles. This explains why it is more difficult to classify individuals who played
longer cycles; unclassified individuals played cycles lasting 25.8 periods on average, as opposed
to 13.6 periods for classified individuals. The key issue is thus to determine under what
dimensions unclassified and classified individuals differ.20
[Table 3 approximately here]
Result 3. Classified individuals exhibited higher average payoffs than unclassified
individuals.
Support for Result 3 is in Table 3. Mean profits are significantly greater for classified than
unclassified individuals (18.7 vs. 15.2; p-value is 0.061 when controlling for cycle length and
0.014 without it; N1=96, N2=406). This suggests, although it does not prove, that the two-state
automata considered include the best-performing strategies.
As it may be expected, classified individuals exhibited lower volatility of play than unclassified
individuals. Volatility of play is defined as the frequency of switch between cooperation and
defection choices. The average switch frequencies for classified individuals are significantly
lower than for unclassified individuals: 9.3% vs. 34.3% (p-value of 0.005 in both cases; N1=94,
N2=406).21 Interestingly, both classified and unclassified individuals faced a volatile
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We generated data on individual play through simulations, to determine whether p increases the fit by simply
capturing random play. Each simulated player was assigned action C or D at random in each period, drawing from a
fixed probability distribution, which corresponded to the empirically observed distribution of actions in the
experiment. When running the same strategy-fitting procedure on this simulated dataset, we classify 25% of
individuals when p=0 and 41% when p=0.05. These figures are directly comparable with those from the
experimental data in Table 3 (53% and 81%, respectively). Adding a probability p of incorrect transition does
increase the number of individuals classified, but to a much lesser extent than in the experimental data. Hence, p
does not simply capture random play in the experimental data.
21
The p-values reported in this Section are obtained from regressions results as explained below. We did not rely on
statistical tests because observations are generally not independent. Statistics are computed aggregating observations
by subject and cycle, unless otherwise noted. Thus we always have 500 observations in total. Strictly speaking, these
observations are independent only if we focus on the first cycle. In this Section comparisons are carried out through
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environment. Hence, the difference in switch frequency is not a mere consequence of being
exposed to opponents with more erratic behavior.
The Z-tree software recorded the number of seconds a subject employed to make each choice.
The decision time is the number of seconds elapsed between the appearance of the input screen
and the confirmation of the choice. Decision time is an additional descriptive variable for
subjects’ strategies for which there is a growing interest in experimental economics as well as
psychology (e.g., Chabris at al. 2008, or see Kosinski, 2006 for psychology). In particular, the
literature has suggested that decision time is related to the difficulty of the task, learning, and
impulsive or deliberate nature of the decision being made (Rubinstein, 2007). The median
decision time for choosing between C and D is more than 35% longer for unclassified than
classified subjects (Table 3: 4.26 vs. 3.09 seconds). However, this difference is not significant.
One could think of two alternative interpretations of Result 3. On the one hand, unclassified
individuals may be more sophisticated than classified individuals, and so they adopt strategies
that are more complex than the ones that can be identified by two-state automata. This greater
complexity requires higher cognitive effort, thus longer decision time, and include more frequent
action switches due to richer contingencies. On the other hand, unclassified individuals may
simply be undecided on what behavior to adopt, and so experiment more within their strategy.
The difference in profits for classified and unclassified subjects emerging from Table 3 suggests
that experimentation is a likely explanation.22

regressions where the dependent variable is alternatively (i) average frequency of switch, (ii) average profit, and (iii)
mean decision time per observation. The independent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the observation is
classified by any of the 32 strategies considered (zero otherwise). The regression includes fixed effects at the subject
level, and errors are computed clustering at the session level. Full regression results are available upon request.
22
Notice however that this does not imply that every set of classified strategies does better than any set of
unclassified strategies. For example, in stationary environments (last two panels of Table 3), individuals following
“systematically cooperate” earn less than unclassified individuals because defecting always increases payoffs.
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Having described a central difference between classified and unclassified individuals, we
now turn to examining what strategies characterize the behavior of classified individuals. We are
especially interested in the grim trigger strategy, as it has a prominent role in the way folk
theorems define the equilibrium set and the efficiency frontier. Such a strategy supports
cooperation by prescribing the harshest possible penalty through decentralized, contagious
punishment. Hence, it may appeal to subjects interested in sustaining cooperation in four-person
economies where individual reputation cannot be developed.
Result 4. The grim trigger strategy classifies at most one individual out of four, even when
allowing for limited randomness in behavior.
At most 26.8% of individuals’ behavior is consistent with adoption of the grim trigger
strategy. This percentage falls to 18.4% when considering deterministic automata. Recall that
we use the word “individual” to denote the sequence of all choices of a subject in a single cycle.
This classification does not require a subject to follow the same strategy consistently across all
cycles. Support for Result 4 comes from Table 3. There is a discrepancy between the results from
the Probit analysis (Result 1) and fitting automata on individuals (Result 4).23 Our probit analysis
overestimates the behavior compatible with grim trigger in comparison with the classification of
individuals based on automata. To reconcile this apparent discrepancy, we note that a strong
aggregate response to an observed defection may result from use of strategies that prescribe
punishment forms other than grim trigger. From Table 3, one can see that 33.6% of individuals
employ conditional punishment strategies that are unlike grim trigger. Adoption of such
strategies can generate the observed aggregate pattern of response to a defection.
23

As pointed out by a referee, the disparity between aggregate and individual behavior is what one would expect in
economies where some subjects playing “Grim Trigger” coexisted with subjects playing “Always defect” and
“Always cooperate.”
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Result 5. There was heterogeneity in individual behavior and no single strategy can classify
the majority of individuals.
Table 3 displays a summary of results from the empirical identification of strategies. The data
suggest the use of heterogeneous strategies. The most common behavior was consistent with
“systematically cooperate.” The three other largest clusters of classified individuals acted as if
having adopted a strategy from classes of strategies, which we denoted “systematically defect,”
“forgiving.” and “grim trigger”. Interestingly, individuals adopting unconditional strategies
greatly outnumbered those using conditional ones, which marks a difference from other
experimental studies about cooperative tasks (Fischbacher et al., 2001) in which a majority of
subjects adopt strategies of conditional cooperation. We address this discrepancy in Section 8,
where we consider also conditional strategies with longer memory. Moreover, twice as many
individuals selected a strategy with cooperation as the initial action, as opposed to an initial
defection. In sum, the data suggest the existence of heterogeneity in the strategies followed by
individuals and a “preference” for strategies that, roughly speaking, are more cooperative.
As a robustness check, Table 3 reports the strategy-fitting procedure run on three disjoint
subsamples: observations in which opponents (i) cooperated as well as defected, (ii) always
cooperated, (iii) always defected. Not surprisingly, it is easier to classify observations in a
stationary environment because subjects tend to adopt more stable behavior, which is consistent
with a wide set of the strategies studied. The percentage of classified individuals grows from
78% (317 out of 406) in subsample (i) to 94% (88 out of 94) in subsamples (ii) and (iii).
However, subsample (i) is clearly the most useful for the purpose of identifying strategies, and
Result 5 is robust when we only consider subsample (i). Among classified individuals, the grim
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trigger strategy was only the third most common strategy (22.7%). Instead, behavior consistent
with “systematically cooperate” had the highest total fit and classified 45.8% of individuals.
Conversely, “systematically defect” classified 33.4% of the individuals.
To sum up, the strategy fitting analysis uncovered significant heterogeneity in individual
behavior. Only a minority of individuals acted as if using grim trigger (see also Offerman et al.,
2001), while a significant fraction of individuals exhibited unconditional behavior, i.e., played an
action that was fixed and independent of the opponents’ actions. The uncovered heterogeneity in
individual behavior sheds light on the observed patterns of cooperation in society. When people
follow a social norm that involves threats of unforgiving economy-wide punishment, it may take
just one individual that follows a different strategy to completely unravel cooperation. This
suggests that, for a given degree of heterogeneity in the population, full cooperation is harder to
sustain in larger economies. Studying four-person economies is an initial step in this direction.
Up to this point the analyses were static. Further information can be gathered by extending the
analysis to study dynamic patterns of choices.
Result 6. Individual behavior changed with experience: 81% of subjects changed strategy
from cycle to cycle. Yet, experience did not lead to the general adoption of any specific strategy.
Recall that each subject in the experiment generates five observations on strategies, i.e., five
individuals, one per cycle. If a given strategy q fits all five observations generated by a subject,
then we say that strategy q classifies that subject. When we follow each subject across cycles, the
data yields a very strong result. Only 19 out of 100 subjects can be classified according to the
same strategy in all cycles. Of these, 11 and 7 can be classified as playing “systematically
cooperate” and “systematically defect,” while only 1 subject adopted a steady behavior
consistent with grim trigger. This suggests that most subjects experimented with various
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strategies across cycles perhaps in an effort to search for a strategy that is a “best response” to
play experienced in earlier cycles. In principle, the possibility to experiment with strategies
across cycles could improve the chances to reach full cooperation in later cycles. However the
data show this was not the case, despite the fact that the economies had only four subjects. Local
interactions and anonymity proved to be frictions sufficient to put full cooperation out of reach.
The presence of a learning pattern is confirmed by the analyses of decision times. Decision
times display two major patterns (see Table 4). The median decision time is much longer in cycle
1 than other cycles, which suggest learning takes place (9.50 seconds in cycle 1 vs. 2.2 seconds
in cycle 5). Also, within each cycle the mean decision time is much longer in period 1 than other
periods (13.53 vs. 3.18 seconds), which suggests that the initial decision in a cycle is the most
difficult to make. Both patterns emerge when subjects choose either C or D in period 1, which
suggests that subjects choose a strategy in the first period of a cycle, thus they need to spend
more time thinking. A longer decision time in period 1 of later cycles may reflect
experimentation with strategies across cycles.
[Table 4 approximately here]
The data suggest that subjects dealt with the heterogeneity in behavior by tolerating some
defections in attempting to coordinate with a subset of participants in the economy. Unlike in
two-person economies, in four-person economies a coalition of subjects can profitably
coordinate on cooperation. To fix ideas, given the parameterization chosen, a subject can earn
more than the minmax payoff even if two persons in the economy always defect. The key
requirement is that the remaining subject must cooperate sufficiently often. If two subjects
always defect, then a subject who always cooperates earns more than the minmax payoff as long
as the third subject cooperates at least 75% of the times. This suggests that a stable subset of
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systematic cooperators could emerge even if there are systematic defectors. The empirical
relevance of these behavioral considerations is well illustrated in the result that follows.
Result 7. Systematic defectors and systematic cooperators coexisted within most economies.
To provide evidence for Result 7, we categorize each of the 125 experimental economies
depending on the classification of individuals within each economy. Individuals classified as
systematic cooperators coexisted with systematic defectors in more than half of the economies.24
In addition, we categorize the 212 individuals classified by the “systematic cooperation” class
according to their presence within each economy. Only 41 individuals were the sole systematic
cooperator in the economy, while 56 individuals were found in economies where everybody
systematically cooperated. The remaining 115 individuals systematically cooperated in
economies where someone, though not everyone, sometimes defected.25 In other words, the data
show that oftentimes subjects unconditionally cooperated even in economies where defectors
were present, which supports the view that subgroups successfully coordinated on cooperation.
As earlier noted, disciplining a lone, anonymous defector by punishing future random opponents
impairs the possibility of coordinating on cooperation with the others. This provides a behavioral
justification for why grim trigger is not the strategy of choice in our experimental economies.
Indeed, Results 7 shows that persistent opportunistic behavior goes often unpunished.

Clearly,

there may be other reasons for the observed behavior, such as other regarding preferences. Other24

In only 3 economies we could not classify individuals as either systematic cooperators or systematic defectors; in
64 economies both classes of strategies were observed; in 39 economies there were systematic cooperators but no
systematic defectors; and in 19 economies the reverse was true. The average length of cycles in each of these four
categories of economies was, respectively, 32.7, 11.8, 18.2, and 22.4 periods. This evidence also suggests, although
it does not prove, that strategies based on the public randomization device were uncommon.
25
Subjects who followed “systematically cooperate” faced environments characterized by different degrees of
cooperation: 48 subjects faced 100% cooperation; 61 faced a cooperation rate between 67% and 99%; 64 subjects
faced a cooperation rate between 33% and 66%, and 39 faced less than 33% cooperation. This means that the
expected payoff for a subject following “systematically cooperate” is at least 15.3 points, which is higher than the
minmax payoff of 10.
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regarding preferences may support or hinder the use of “systematically cooperate” strategies
depending on what motivates subjects. On the one hand, altruistic motives and positive
reciprocity may prevent subjects from punishing after observing a defection because punishment
destroys surplus and harms cooperators and defectors alike. On the other hand, positional
motives reinforce the urge to punish after a defection in order to prevent others from getting
ahead in terms of relative share of income.
7. Strategy identification through maximum likelihood
Here, we estimate the importance of each candidate strategy with a maximum likelihood
approach, as in Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) and Fudenberg et al. (forthcoming). This
methodology enhances comparability with related studies and allows us to study the case when
automata can make errors in implementing actions, as opposed to errors in transitions.
The estimation comprises a set of twenty-six strategies.26 The estimation employs data from all
cycles and presumes that subjects (i) have a given probability of choosing one of the 26
strategies, (ii) may change strategies from cycle to cycle and (iii) may make errors on actions,
i.e., with some probability may choose an action that is not recommended by the strategy. 27
The maximum likelihood estimation differs from the one presented in Section 5 because (a)
it relies on the assumption that subjects may make errors in actions (not in transitions) and (b) it
estimates the prevalence of errors in implementing actions (the parameter ), rather than
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There are 26 strategies now because if there are no errors in transitions, then every strategy in the class
“Systematically cooperate” (Systematically defect”) coincides with the one-state automaton “Always cooperate”
(Always defect). All two-state automata in the class “Systematically cooperate” (“Systematically defect”) prescribe
the same behavior as the strategy “Always cooperate” (“Always defect”).
27
The estimation was executed adapting the code included in the supplementary material of Dal Bó and Fréchette
(2011), where the reader can also find the details of the estimation procedure. However, unlike in Dal Bó and
Fréchette (2011) and Fudenberg et al. (forthcoming), our estimation procedure assumes that subjects may change
strategies from cycle to cycle; the code has been adapted accordingly.
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imposing a maximal number of errors (the parameter p).28 One can illustrate the difference
between errors in actions and in transitions using as an example the “Grim trigger” automaton.
If everyone plays grim trigger, then a single wrong choice moves the economy to permanent
punishment, which is an absorbing state because a mistake is never forgotten. Instead, mistakes
in transition allow for a sort of experimentation within the strategy, as it is still possible to
change state and revert to a cooperative mode, hence we may observe “fresh starts” or alternating
spells of cooperation and punishment. The maximum likelihood estimates the prevalence of
errors in actions (the parameter ) and “classifies” every individual. Instead, fitting automata to
observations, as done in Section 6, implies that a fraction of observations may end up
“unclassified.” Because this fraction depends on the exogenously-specified maximal number of
errors in transitions (the parameter p), the strategy-fitting procedure helps us assessing the
sensitivity of results to increasing margins of error (Figure 3).
[Table 5 approximately here]
Table 5 reports the estimates of the population proportions for each of the 26 strategies. These
maximum likelihood estimates confirm the main results on strategy identification reported in
Section 6. The four most likely strategies are “Always cooperate”, “Grim trigger”, “Tit-for-Tat”
and “Always defect” and, as noted in Result 5, there is significant heterogeneity in individual
behavior with no strategy clearly prevailing. In line with Result 4, grim trigger can account only
for a minority of observations, in the order of one out of five. Table 5 provides additional support
for the finding that a significant fraction of individuals (more than 50%) exhibited unconditional
behavior, i.e., chose an action that was fixed and independent of the actions of previous
opponents. In short, the results reported in Section 6 are robust to the use of a maximum
28

The assumption that subjects can make mistakes in implementing actions also underlies the approach adopted by
Engle-Warnick, McCausland, and Miller (2004).
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likelihood approach and to consideration of errors in actions. The strategy-identification
approach proposed in Section 5 allows us to perform additional empirical analyses of the
behavior of individuals, such as differentiating classified and unclassified individuals. It also
allows us to assess how the explanatory power of a given strategy varies as we increase the
probability of errors.
The finding that a majority of subjects followed strategies compatible with unconditional
behavior departs from findings in other experimental studies about cooperation (e.g., Fischbacher
et al., 2001), and so it should be further investigated. Indeed, it is possible that some observations
could result from subjects using complex conditional strategies that cannot be represented by
two-state automata. More concretely, consider an individual who starts defecting after suffering
several defections in the previous four rounds. This individual could be classified as
“systematically cooperate” when allowing for some errors in transitions, although she may in
fact punish as part of a strategy conditional on the number of defections suffered. We investigate
this possibility in Section 8, where we repeat the strategy-fitting procedures adopted in Sections
6 and 7 for an expanded set of strategies.
8. Robustness check on strategy classification
We expand the strategy set to also include 11 conditional cooperative strategies with longer
memory. In particular, we follow Fudenberg et al. (forthcoming) and include “lenient” variants
of grim trigger and of “forgiving” strategies. These strategies prescribe initial cooperation and a
switch to defection after the player has met k≥1 defecting opponents. We consider variants in
which the punishment can be either permanent (as in Grim trigger) or temporary (as in TFT); the
triggering event can be a cumulative, a consecutive or a proportional count of defections (see
notes to Tables 6-7).
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[Table 6 approximately here]
Table 6 reports the results for the classification approach proposed in Section 5. When
considering the full sample, the conditional strategies with longer memory classify only 26
observations that were not already classified under any of the one- and two-state deterministic
automata. Hence, the fraction of classified individuals marginally increase from 53% to 58.2%
(p=0). In addition, no single strategy with longer memory that we considered has a total fit as
high as “always cooperate” (which is 134 in the full sample and 70 in the sample restricted to
opponents playing both C and D). To further assess the power of strategies with longer memory,
Table 6 reports the number of individuals classified by each new strategy in addition to those
jointly classified by “always cooperate,” “grim trigger,” and “tit-for-tat” (last column). One can
see a substantial overlap between the individuals classified by the above 3 strategies and the 11
conditional strategies with longer memory.
Note also that most individuals classified by “always cooperate” are classified also by one or
more conditional strategies with longer memory (126 out of 134). This is not surprising: any
observation consisting of an uninterrupted sequence of cooperative actions is compatible with
“always cooperate” and with cooperative strategies in which punishment is triggered by a
condition that never took place. Grim2 is largely responsible for the increase in the total number
of classified observations.
[Table 7 approximately here]
Table 7 reports the results obtained using the maximum likelihood approach. When considering
the full sample, the parameter  marginally decreases from 0.54 to 0.48. We find that “Always
cooperate” and “Grim trigger” lose some share, which is captured by lenient longer-memory
variants of conditional cooperative strategies (i.e., Grim and Tit-for-tat). Yet, we also find that
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the two unconditional strategies “Always cooperate” and “Always defect” are still the ones that
capture the behavior of the greatest shares of individuals.
To sum up, based on the strategy classification method, one cannot strictly rule out that
individuals classified as “Always cooperate” are following conditional strategies with longer
memory. In Table 6, the longer-memory strategies considered classify most of the observations
also classified by “Always cooperate.” However, based on the maximum likelihood estimates,
we find that the unconditional strategy “Always cooperate” is still the one that captures the
greatest share of cooperative strategies (Table 7).
9. Final Remarks
This experimental study offers novel insights about subjects’ strategies in decentralized trading
environments where mutual gains from cooperation coexist with incentives to behave
opportunistically. We studied economies where subjects faced an indefinite sequence of
prisoner’s dilemmas played in pairs with changing opponents. Because the interaction was
anonymous, subjects could not build a reputation. Moreover, each economy comprised four
subjects, which made coordination harder to achieve than in two-person economies that have
been the focus of previous experiments with indefinite interaction.
We empirically study equilibrium and strategy selection in supergames. In our setup, a social
norm based on the threat of contagious punishment can support full cooperation. The analysis
accounts for equilibrium strategies—such as grim trigger and unconditional defection—as well
as for non-equilibrium strategies—such as tit-for-tat and unconditional cooperation. The
experimental design helps the empirical identification of individual strategies thanks to
substantially longer sequences of play than previous work, a design based on four-person
economies, and a diverse subject pool (college students, MBA students, and white-collar
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workers).
An assessment based on a standard Probit regression analysis suggests that there is a strong
initial attempt to coordinate on cooperation and the first experienced defection triggered a
permanent downward shift in cooperation levels. More in-depth strategy-identification analyses
reveal that grim trigger is not the prevalent norm of behavior. Subjects did not follow social
norms that rely on contagious punishment schemes. Furthermore, we found substantial
heterogeneity in the strategies used, which persisted with experience. These findings are robust
to the adoption of three alternative strategy-identification techniques: fitting deterministic
automata; fitting automata that can transition from state to state stochastically; identifying
strategies through a maximum likelihood approach.
Subjects tried to reach a cooperative outcome but did so without being able to coordinate
their strategy choices, independently searching for suitable strategies. In such an environment,
unilaterally adopting grim trigger does not make full cooperation more likely. In fact, if a
subgroup of subjects wants to coordinate on cooperation, then playing grim trigger may
jeopardize coordination attempts and simply drag the economy towards full defection. This may
explain why grim trigger was uncommon in the data and why systematic defection did not crowd
out systematic cooperation.
Grim trigger seems to be rare also in field settings with repeated social dilemmas. Ostrom
(2010) surveyed field studies of community management of fisheries and water resources and
did not find a single case where harvesters used the grim trigger strategy. These considerations
point to a weak predictive power of theories based on homogeneous agents who adopt strategies
of uncompromising, contagious punishment. This suggests care must be taken in drawing
immediate conclusions from applications based on folk theorems. For example, theories that
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trace the efficiency frontier by presuming everyone follows a norm of unforgiving, universal
punishment, have low descriptive power vis-à-vis our experiment. Adoption of a social norm
based on grim trigger did not emerge in our economies where reputation-based strategies were
unavailable. The possibility to resort to norms of decentralized, contagious punishment did not
stave-off opportunistic behavior. On the contrary, most subjects were willing to forgive a
defection, to different degrees. Some reacted to a defection with a temporary punishment, while
others systematically cooperated even in the presence of relentless defectors.
These findings suggest that, on the one hand further investigations should be conducted with
larger economies, to determine whether the findings with four-agent economies hold when the
economy’s size increases. On the other hand, a theoretical challenge remains, which is to
increase the descriptive power of folk theorem-type results in interactions among strangers.
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Tables and Figures
(A) Notation in the theoretical analysis
Player 1/
Player 2
Cooperate
(Y)
Defect
(Z)

Cooperate
(Y)

Defect
(Z)

y,y

l,h

h,l

z,z

(B) Parameterization of the experiment
Player 1/
Player 2
Cooperate
(Y)
Defect
(Z)

Cooperate
(Y)
25, 25

Defect
(Z)
5, 30

30, 5

10, 10

Table 1: The stage game
Strategies starting with
C=cooperate
Strategy
11111
11110
11101
11100
11000
11010
11011
11001
10111
10110
10101
10100
10011
10010
10001
10000

Strategy Set
Systematically cooperate
Grim trigger
Forgiving

Unconventional

Strategies starting with
D=defect
N
168
178
166
188
134
113
103
107
10
13
13
21
2
9
7
24

Strategy
00000
01000
00100
01100
00001
00010
00011
01001
01010
01011
00101
00110
00111
01101
01110
01111

Strategy Set
Systematically defect

Unconventional

N
111
109
94
98
26
11
5
25
13
7
21
9
3
22
11
6

Table 2: Classification of strategies
Notes: In this table p=0.05. N is the number of observations classified by a strategy. Each of the 32 strategies is
coded as a five-element vector. Each element corresponds to a state, i.e., an action to be taken, with C =1 and D=0.
The first element is the initial state. The remaining four elements identify the state reached following current play
(equivalently, the action to be implemented in the next round). Denote c and d the actions of the opponent. The
second element in the vector identifies the state reached if (C,c) is played. The remaining elements identify the states
reached given play (C,d), (D,c) and (D,d), respectively. For instance the automaton 11010 represents “tit-for-tat.” It
starts with C, prescribes play D in two instances, if (C,d) or (D,d) are the outcomes (third and fifth element in the
sequence), and prescribes play C if (C,c) or (D,c) are the outcomes. The first four automata in each column are
called “systematically cooperate” and “systematically defect” because they prescribe the automaton should remain
always in the initial state (cooperate or defect) unless a random shock generates a transition to an incorrect state. For
instance, with 11110 the agent starts in state C and remains in C; state D can be reached only by mistake, in which
case the player remains in D only if her opponent plays d (last element of the vector). Clearly the automaton 11111
is unconditional cooperation (always cooperate), i.e., does not allow for mistakes or experimentation. The same
holds for unconditional defection, 00000 (always defect).
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32 automata
All Observations
C in period 1
D in period 1
Classified
C in period 1
-systematically cooperate
-forgiving
-grim trigger
-unconventional
D in period 1
-systematically defect
-unconventional
Unclassified
C in period 1
D in period 1
Opponents play both C & D
Classified
C in period 1
-systematically cooperate
-forgiving
-grim trigger
-unconventional
D in period 1
-systematically defect
-unconventional
Unclassified
C in period 1
D in period 1
Opponents always play C
Classified
C in period 1
-systematically cooperate
-forgiving
-grim trigger
-unconventional
D in period 1
-systematically defect
- unconventional
Unclassified
C in period 1
D in period 1
Opponents always play D
Classified
C in period 1
-systematically cooperate
-forgiving
-grim trigger
-unconventional
D in period 1
-systematically defect
- unconventional
Unclassified
C in period 1
D in period 1

Random transitions (p=0.05)
N median response time average profit
500
3.42
18.06
336
3.51
17.68
2.93
18.85
164
405
3.09
18.74
3.38
18.28
272
212
3.00
18.60
130
4.33
20.52
134
3.45
20.79
44
4.35
14.40
2.56
19.67
133
120
2.49
19.51
48
5.09
21.87
95
4.26
15.18
64
4.32
15.11
31
4.20
15.33
406
3.50
17.12
317
3.41
17.65
3.84
16.90
201
3.41
16.69
145
68
8.00
17.16
72
4.85
17.86
32
3.45
16.63
116
2.54
18.95
2.46
18.89
106
31
5.54
20.39
89
4.06
15.24
62
4.21
15.07
27
3.44
15.63
75
2.2
25.83
73
2.14
25.79
60
2.00
25.06
59
2.00
25.00
59
2.00
25.00
59
2.00
25.00
1
6.00
28.33
13
2.86
29.16
10
5.01
30.00
13
2.86
29.16
2
4.94
27.23
1
4.55
26.13
1
5.33
28.33
19
6.84
7.52
15
6.84
7.44
11
7.60
6.63
8
8.05
5.96
3
4.00
8.44
3
4.00
8.44
11
7.60
6.63
4
2.37
9.64
4
2.37
9.64
4
2.37
9.64
4
6.56
7.83
1
8.00
6.67
3
5.43
8.22

Table 3: Analysis of individual strategies
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Deterministic (p=0.00)
N
average profit
500
18.06
336
17.68
164
18.85
265
19.82
173
19.45
134
19.92
90
22.44
92
22.18
28
15.20
92
20.50
86
20.33
28
24.16
235
16.08
163
15.80
72
16.74
406
17.12
182
18.13
105
17.26
70
16.71
28
18.53
30
18.02
19
18.26
77
19.31
74
19.31
13
21.35
224
16.31
158
15.94
66
17.17
75
25.83
73
25.79
60
25.06
59
25.00
59
25.00
59
25.00
1
28.33
13
29.16
10
30.00
13
29.16
2
27.23
1
26.13
1
28.33
19
7.52
10
7.03
8
6.29
5
5.00
3
8.44
3
8.44
8
6.29
2
10.00
2
10.00
2
10.00
9
8.06
4
7.33
5
8.65

Notes: The unit of observation is the sequence of all choices of a subject in a cycle, i.e., an individual. When no
confusion arises we refer to such a sequence as one observation. There are 500 observations. N refers to the number
of observations classified by the corresponding strategy. An observation is classified according to strategy set Q, if
at least one strategy qQ fits, i.e.: (i) the initial action is correctly predicted by q; (ii) q has the largest consistency
score (see explanation in text) among all strategies in Q; and (iii) when we allow for random transitions, the
probability of observing n or more inconsistent actions is smaller than 10% given the experimentation parameter
p=0.05. Otherwise, the observation is “Unclassified.” Clearly, if we do not allow for random transitions, i.e. p=0,
then item (iii) is modified as follows: the probability of observing any inconsistent action must be zero.

(1 obs. = a single choice in a period)
Cooperation in all periods (in %)
Cooperation in period 1 (in %)
Coordination on cooperation (in %)
Average profit per period (in points)
Median decision time (in seconds)
Switch frequency (in %)
All observations
(1 obs = an individual)
Classified observations (in %)
of which: classified by grim trigger
Subsample: opponents play both C and D (N)
Classified observations (in %)
of which: classified by grim trigger

1

2

Cycle
3

53.9
74.0
33.3
18.09
9.50
33.2

54.3
64.0
31.0
18.15
3.96
25.3

48.3
65.0
30.6
17.24
2.37
25.6

57.6
68.0
40.3
18.64
2.00
23.9

54.6
65.0
34.5
18.19
2.20
32.8

76.0
23.0

83.0
18.0

69.0
25.0

89.0
31.0

88.0
37.0

75.3
18.8

81.9
14.9

61.7
13.6

87.3
18.3

85.3
24.0

4

5

Total
53.8
67.2
33.9
18.06
3.42
28.2
500
81.0
26.8
406
78.1
17.7

Table 4: Summary statistics by cycle
Notes: “Cooperation” reports the percentage of C choices; “Coordination on cooperation” reports the percentage of
subject pairs were both chose C: it indicates the mean of cc where cc is 1 for a C choice when the opponent chose C
and is 0 for a C choice when the opponent did D and for a D choice.
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Strategies starting with D=defect

Strategies starting with C=cooperate
Strategy

Strategy Set

Coeff.

S.E.

11111 Systematically cooperate

0.336

0.043***

11000 Grim trigger
11010 Forgiving
11011
11001
10111 Unconventional
10110
10101
10100
10011
10010
10001
10000

0.190 0.043***
0.158 0.041***
0.000 n.a.
0.000 0.002
0.000 0.000
0.002 0.004
0.000 0.000
0.015 0.017
0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000
0.000 0.006
0.000 0.002
0.542 0.064***



Strategy

Strategy Set

Coeff.

S.E.

00000 Systematically defect

0.282

0.056***

00001 Unconventional
00010
00011
01001
01010
01011
00101
00110
00111
01101
01110
01111

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.005
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.000
0.000
0.009
0.000
0.000

0.002
0.000
0.000
0.005
0.013
0.000
0.004
0.004
0.001
0.010
0.000
0.000

Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates of individual strategies
Notes: p-values are calculated using bootstrapped standard errors. The coefficient for strategy 11011 is not estimated
directly, but it is implied by the fact that the proportions must sum to one.  is an endogenous parameter of the
estimation that measures the probability of errors. A larger  denotes a higher probability of errors. * Significant at
the 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.

42

All Observations
Classified by at least one of the
26 strategies with short memory.
Classified by at least one of the
37 strategies
Grim 2 A
Grim 3 A
Grim 2 B
Grim 3 B
Grim 33%
Grim 67%
Grim 100%
2TFT
3TFT
TF2T
TF3T
Unclassified
Opponents play both C and D
Classified by at least one of the
26 strategies with short memory.
Classified by at least one of the
37 strategies
Grim 2 A
Grim 3 A
Grim 2 B
Grim 3 B
Grim 33%
Grim 67%
Grim 100%
2TFT
3TFT
TF2T
TF3T
Unclassified

N

Observations not classified by either “always
cooperate,” “grim trigger,” or “tit-for-tat”

500

336

265

101

291
107
102
112
123
103
123
118
87
91
109
120
209

127
18
4
14
4
1
9
0
3
4
11
1
0

406

309

182

85

207
46
39
51
60
41
61
56
26
30
48
57
199

110
17
4
13
4
1
9
0
2
3
10
1
0

Table 6: Conditional strategies with longer memory
Notes: Strategy Grim2 (Grim3) triggers to permanent punishment when two (three) past opponents defected.
Strategies Grim A consider the total number of past defections (in the cycle), while Grim B considers only the
number of consecutive defections. Strategy Grim33% (Grim67%, Grim100%) triggers the punishment phase when
the frequency of defections reaches 33% (67%, 100%). Strategy TF2T (TF3T) prescribes C unless each of the last
two (three) opponents played D. Strategy 2TFT (3TFT) prescribes C unless a defection was suffered in either of the
last 2 (3) rounds. Automata are deterministic, i.e., p=0. The automaton “always cooperate” is 11111, “grim trigger”
is 11000, and “tit-for-tat” is 11010.
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Strategies starting with C=cooperate
Strategy
11111
11000
11010
11011
11001
10111
10110
10101
10100
10011
10010
10001
10000

Strategy Set
Systematically cooperate
Grim trigger
Forgiving

Unconventional

Grim 2 A Variants of Grim trigger
Grim 3 A
Grim 2 B
Grim 3 B
Grim 33%
Grim 67%
Grim 100%


Coeff.

Strategies starting with D=defect
S.E.

0.138 0.040***
0.050 0.025**
0.067 0.022*
0.000 0.001
0.002 0.004
0.000 0.000
0.002 0.004
0.000 0.002
0.004 0.008
0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000
0.000 0.006
0.000 0.001
0.038 0.021*
0.038 0.035
0.022 0.020
0.086 0.025***
0.000 0.011
0.085 0.052
0.000 0.014
0.486 0.064***

Strategy
Strategy Set
00000 Systematically defect
00001 Unconventional
00010
00011
01001
01010
01011
00101
00110
00111
01101
01110
01111
2TFT Variants of Tit-for-tat
3TFT
TF2T
TF3T

Coeff.

S.E.

0.282
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.005
0.001
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.000
0.007
0.000
0.000
0.012
0.025
0.072
0.061

0.064***
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.006
0.014
0.000
0.005
0.000
0.000
0.011
0.000
0.000
0.012
0.024
0.025***
n.a.**

Table 7: Maximum likelihood estimates of conditional strategies with longer memory
Notes: p-values are calculated using bootstrapped standard errors. The coefficient for strategy
TF3T is not estimated directly, but it is implied by the fact that the proportions must sum to one.
 is an endogenous parameter of the estimation that measures the probability of errors. A larger 
denotes a higher probability of errors. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at 5% level,
*** significant at 1% level. For the definitions of the variants of Grim trigger and Tit-for-tat see
the notes to Table 6.
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a - Automaton

b - Automaton with random transitions

Grim Trigger

Tit-for-tat

Figure 1: Strategy representation using automata (C=cooperate, D=Defect)

Figure 2: Aggregate response to an observed defection
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Figure 3: Percentage of classified observations
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